This paper shows that the presence of large public pension fund shareholders particularly reduces ex ante bad acquisitions. When firms with large public pension fund presence do acquire other firms, they perform relatively better in the long-run. Other institutional investors have either the opposite effect or no effect. Identifying the sources of exogenous variation in institutional ownership is crucial to establish the direction of causality between institutional ownership and observed corporate merger and acquisition decisions. This paper introduces two new approaches. First, I decompose the institutional ownership into one component which is correlated with future M&A shocks, and the noise component which is not. I instrument for the various ownerships using this noise term. Second, I instrument for institutional ownership using exogenous shocks to their portfolio sizes interacted with their propensities to invest in each corporation.
Introduction
Institutional investors hold more than half of all U.S. publicly traded equity. 1 The fastest growing institutional investors -public pension funds and mutual funds -saw their assets growing at compound annual growth rates of 14% and 20%, respectively, in the 1990s. 2 Many theories 3 have suggested that shareholders with large investment stakes -often institutional investors -are the most likely monitors of publicly traded companies. However, there has been very little evidence empirically documenting the effectiveness of institutional investor monitoring.
The main hurdle in establishing institutional investor influence lies in the difficulty of identifying the exogenous variation in their shareholdings. Given the belief 4 that they are often smarter and better informed than individual investors, institutional ownership, firm performance, and firm decisions are often jointly determined. It is quite difficult to find an appropriate instrument to establish the direction of causation. Variables such as dividend yield, liquidity, return volatility, transaction costs, and major index inclusion etc., either are weak instruments, or are correlated with the shocks to firm decisions.
To surmount this difficulty, I introduce two new IV approaches to study institutional investor influence in corporate M&A activity. These strategies rely on very different sources of variation and identification assumptions, but they reach similar conclusions of the study. First, I identify an institutional investor's preference for firm acquisitiveness using its portfolio composition, and decompose its ownership into one component that is related to this preference, and the noise component that is orthorgonal to it. The assumption I make is that institutional preference is stable over a horizon of one year. Given this assumption, if institutions are able to forecast future shocks Davis and Steil (2001) 3 Jensen and Meckling (1976) , Shleifer and Vishny (1986) , Admati, Pfleiderer, and Zechner (1994) , and many others have argued that well-informed institutional investors with a substantial equity stake can exert influence and reduce the agency problem between managers and shareholders with positive ramifications on firm value.
4 Coval and Moskowitz (2001) , Parrino, Sias, and Starks (2003) , and many others have offered emipirical evidence.
in firm acquisition activity, the preference-related component represents the part of the institutional ownership which corresponds to the future shocks. By construction, the noise component is not correlated with the shocks, and is utilized as an instrumental variable for the institutional ownership.
Second, I borrow the concept of "Bartik instrument" from labor research (Bartik (1991), Blanchard and Katz (1992) ), by interacting exogenous shocks to an institutional investor's portfolio with its propensity to invest in a given firm. The assumption is that institutions' portfolio sizes vary exogenously half a year (on average) prior to M&A announcements. Institutional ownership is instrumented with this Bartik instrument to address the ownership endogeneity. The validity of both identification assumptions are further discussed in the later part of this paper.
Most of the prior studies on institutional investor focus on the impact of shareholder proxy proposals targeting governance issues. While this is the most visible governance activity by institutional investors, there are several reasons to suspect that event responses to proxy proposals do not fully represent the impact of shareholder activism. First, proxy proposals are advisory rather than binding (Pound (1988) , Gordon and Pound (1993) ). Managers are not obliged to adopt these proposals even if they receive a majority vote from shareholders. The data used in event studies which examine announcement stock returns will inevitably include many shareholder proposals that are never implemented. 5 Consequently, it is not surprising that stock price reactions to these events are modest and difficult to detect. Second, proposals will be withdrawn and thus not disclosed if management voluntarily adopts them. The inclusion of the proposal in the proxy materials may reflect the management's negative response to shareholder concerns, and may thus be associated with negative stock market reactions (Prevost and Rao (2000) ).
In this paper, I conduct a new test of the impact of institutional investors on the governance of firms by examining a major corporate event -M&A activity. In particular, I provide the first test of whether the presence of an institutional investor reduces M&A activities that lower firm values.
M&A activity provides a natural test of the efficacy of institutional investor activism. It occurs frequently and can have a substantial effect on firm values. Theories suggest that mergers can occur for good reasons, such as capturing synergy gains, or for bad reasons, such as agency costs. Many papers, both theoretical and empirical, have argued that M&A can be motivated by managerial incentives and reduce shareholder wealth, such as Amihud and Lev (1981) , Roll (1986) , Agrawal and Mandelker (1987) , Shleifer and Vishny (1989) , Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) , Avery, Chevalier, and Schaefer (1998) , etc. Evidence on bidder performance, both at the announcement and in the long-run, suggests that not all acquisitions are beneficial for bidder shareholders (Jensen and Ruback (1983) , Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (2001) , Agrawal, Jaffe, and Mandelker (1992) Some bidders are more likely to perform worse than others. Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1991) find that bidder returns are significantly lower for low q bidders with high cash flows, which suffer higher agency costs by Jensen's free cash flow theory, than low q bidders with low cash flows. Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) suggest that managerial objectives drive value-reducing acquisitions, for example, "buying-growth" acquisition. If institutional investors effectively monitor, then their presence should reduce the likelihood of "bad" M&A driven by managerial incentives, but not "good" M&A.
I find that major public pension funds (PPFs) are playing exactly this role. PPFs have a substantial effect on M&A activity. Their influence is concentrated in the value-reducing acquisitions, namely, when the acquirer is cash-rich and low-q, or is just "buying-growth". Ceteris paribus, a 1% increase in the largest PPF ownership associates with a 2%-10% reduction in subsequent M&A likelihood for cash rich and low q firms. Because less than one in three of firm-years in the sample are M&A observations, this absolute reduction translates into a 7%-30% relative reduction in M&A frequency. PPFs also do not reduce M&A activity when it is more likely to be good. Acquisitions by cash-poor and low-q firms on average have positive announcement abnormal returns and positive long-term abnormal returns in my sample. PPFs have no effect among these firms. Overall, when firms with large PPF shareholders do undertake acquisitions, their long-run performance (including the announcement month) is better.
The presence of other types of institutions either has no effect or has the opposite effect. The results on investment companies (mostly mutual funds) are particularly interesting. Mutual fund ownership is positively associated with future M&A activity in the whole sample. This association is the strongest among firms with few growth opportunities and a lot of free cash, and among the bidders which "buy growth", i.e., those more likely to suffer agency costs. In the long-term, acquirers with more mutual fund ownership also perform worse in the stock market. The evidence suggests that for firms suffering the most agency conflicts, more mutual fund ownership may insulate the management from more scrutiny and actually encourage more bad M&A.
The evidence of this paper suggests that major public pension funds are the only effective monitors among all institutions. PPFs held 8% of the total U.S. equity market by 2001 (The Conference Board), compared with over 50% owned by all institutions. They are know to be activists of corporate governance. Gillan and Starks (2000) document that PPFs are the most active in governance activities ranging from highly public proxy targeting to closed-door negotiations. In the hotly contested acquisition of Compaq by Hewlett-Packard in 2002, six major public pension funds 6 publicly announced that they would vote against the deal. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section I provides a literature review on institutional shareholder activism. Section II describes the specification and the identification strategy. Section III describes data. Section IV and V discuss institutional ownership impact on M&A likelihood and M&A performance. Section VI concludes the paper.
I Literature Review
Empirical work has not produced much evidence on the role of institutional investors. Most studies on institutional investor activism (Gillan and Starks (2000) , Del Guercio and Hawkins (1999), Karpoff, Malatesta, and Walkling (1996), Wahal (1996) , etc.) focused on institutions' activity in submitting proxy proposals. They found inconclusive results. Other studies (Hartzell and Starks (2002) , Hotchkiss and Strickland (2003) , Parrino, Sias, and Starks (2003) , Song and Szewczyk (2003) , etc.) examine institutions' non-proxy activity, such as their impact on compensation policy, CEO turnover, and market response to corporate event. However, few have discussed in detail how to control for ownership endogeneity.
There is also a large literature regarding the heterogeneity among different types of institutions. Black (1990) (2000) argue that selling constraints imposed by indexing strategies can provide an important motivation for shareholder activism aimed at improving overall market performance. 8
On the other hand, PPFs may suffer their own agency costs and thus may not be effective monitors. Romano (1993) argues that the political pressure faced by the managers of public pension funds may conflict with the goal of profit maximization. Murphy and Van Nuys (1994) find that state pension system officials manage the funds "more conservatively than their corporate counterparts to avoid drawing negative attention to the pension system." Woidtke (2002) finds that firm relative values are negatively related with public pension ownership. 9
In contrast to PPFs, other institutional investors may not want to be active monitors. Roe (1994) argues that legal restrictions often prevent banks, insurance companies, and mutual funds 8 In a speech at Stanford University, March 21, 1996, Richard Koppes, former chief counsel of CalPERS, remarked, "It makes sense for us to try to raise the ocean in order to lift our boat."
9 However, the instrument used in her paper is found to be a weak instrument in my study.
etc., from owning large blocks of shares, and reduce their incentives to monitor. Black (1990) 
II Specification and Identification Strategy
The structural equation is:
where y it , the dependent variable, is a dummy variable measuring firms' M&A activity. It equals one when there is at least one M&A announcement during the 12-month period. t is a time subscript.
An i denotes each firm. u i is the firm-level effect. The ownership variables InstOwnership it (Public Pension Funds, Investment Companies, Others) are the variables of interest in this study. The X it is a vector of control variables including managerial ownership, managerial compensation, the governance index, prior M&A activity, leverage ratio, cash flow ratio, q ratio, firm size, capital expenditures ratio, firm prior performance, and industrial concentration. Since the structural equation controls for past acquisition activity, the ownership variables may be endogenous if institutions are able to predict future shocks to M&A activity, and adjust their ownership accordingly.
The first instrument utilizes information contained in firms' prior acquisition expenditures and in institutional investors' asset allocations. I start by identifying each firm's "acquisitiveness" using its average acquisition expenditure (Compustat items data129/data6) in last five years. Next I find a "preference score" (FundPreference jt ), fund preference for acquisition, for an institutional investor (at time t), by looking at its asset allocation.
w j,it denotes the portfolio weight of firm i's stock in fund j's portfolio at time period t.
For each firm, the "preference score" (FundPreference it ) of each type of its institutional investors is the score of the largest investor within that type. 10 Using this institution "preference", I can orthogonalize each year the institutional ownership of firm i into the acquisition preference related and the non-acquisition related components by running a fixed effect regression, 11
The identifying assumption is that fund preference is stable over a period of one year (own-10 If I use the weighted "FundPreference" of all institutions within each category as the measure for aggregate ownership, the estimations are similar.
11 The earlier draft utilized a tobit regression with firm-level effect, since ownership is censored at zero. Results were similar.
ership at end of June, year t, and M&A activity observed from July, year t to June, year t+1).
Mutual funds often advertise themselves as following a certain style of investment since incipiency. The sample starts in year 1992, the first year executive compensation data is available. Fortunately, accounting information is available for a much longer period. I am able to construct the "preference score" measure for each firm-year. For firms with zero institutional ownership, this measure is set to zero.
The second instrument variable is a so-called "Bartik instrument". The underlying assumption of the approach is that a given institution's portfolio size is exogenous. There are two factors affecting the fund size. One is the net inflow of funds. If individual investors prefer acquisitive firms, can predict future M&A shocks, and can identify a particular mutual fund as having the same preference and the same predictive power, then the fund flow can be endogenous. However, there are few reasons to believe that this scenario is likely to be true. For example, no existing mutual fund advertises itself as M&A-driven. The net inflows of pension funds are determined by generally fixed contributions of their members and their liabilities, which are most likely exogenous. The second factor affecting fund sizes is the performance of their portfolio, which in turn is determined by the current stock price. M&A announcements are often considered surprises. There may be rumors and trading activity in the couple of days leading to an announcement. However, the market is not able to predict M&A activity in an average time horizon of six months. Consequently, the current stock price most likely has not incorporated the future shocks to the M&A likelihood.
The Bartik instrument interacts the exogenous shocks to institutional investors' portfolio sizes with the firm-level propensity of investment, which is obtained as the fixed effects from the following regression by each institutional investor j:
ω i can be considered as j's propensity to invest in firm i. It is not correlated with future M&A shocks, which is captured by e it . ω i is firm specific, and does not vary across time. The institutional investor j's portfolio size varies across time, but not across firm. The Bartik instrument interacts the two, and varies across both firm and time. Similar to the first instrument variable, I use the value from the largest institutional investor within each category to instrument for both the aggregate ownership and the largest individual ownership of each category of institutional investors.
To check that both instruments are valid, I exam the F-statistics from the first-stage IV regressions. The F-stats are much greater than ten. Neither suffers weak instrument problem (Staiger and Stock (1997) ).
Other variables used as controls may also be endogenous. When I exclude all controls from the regressions, results are even stronger. The potential endogeneity of the control variables does not bias the estimates on the ownership variables, which are the focus of this study. Since a detailed discussion of the control variables is beyond the scope of this paper, this issue is left for future explorations.
III Data
The initial sample is the overlap between CRSP and COMPUSTAT databases, with executive compensation data available from the Execucomp database, and governance index data available Takeover Defenses [Rosenbaum 1990 [Rosenbaum , 1993 [Rosenbaum , 1995 [Rosenbaum , 1998 [Rosenbaum , 2000 . For years (1992, 1994, 1996, 1997, 1999 ) during which there is no publication to provide up-to-date governance provision information, I use the most adjacent data as a proxy. shows the timeline of the research design. During calendar year t, corporate accounting data, insider ownership data, and executive compensation data are recorded. The majority of firms end their fiscal years in December. At the end of June, year t+1, institutional ownership is recorded.
The six-month lag ensures that all relevant information is public when institutional ownership data is considered. If the firm announces at least one merger and/or acquisition deal during the period July, year t+1 to June, year t+2, this firm is considered to be an M&A firm for data year t.
Thomson Financial institutional ownership data is available until 2000 at the time of this study.
Execucomp data is available from 1992. Thus my final sample covers firms from 1992 to 1999. Each year, their corresponding institutional ownership (with a 6-month lag) is from end of June holdings in the following year (1993 to 2000); their merger and acquisition data (with a minimum 6-month lag) is collected from July the following year to June two years after. There are 1,362 firms and a total of 6,681 firm-year observations. Table I provides a detailed description of all variables. All relevant data are CPI-adjusted. Table   II shows that this sample is primarily larger firms. In 1992 dollars, the median market capitalization is $1,008.99 million and the median total assets are $905. Among the 6,681 firm-year observations, there are in total 2,022 (30%) M&A observations.
Firms in M&A firm-year observations are larger, have lower insider ownership, higher governance index, higher cash flow ratios, higher q ratios, lower capital expenditures ratios, and better prior performance than those in non-M&A firm-year observations. A total of 147 observations (2.2%) have zero PPF ownership. 11 (7.5%) of those are M&A observations.
IV Institutional Ownership and Likelihood of M&A
It is easier for managers to undertake "bad" M&A when there is no effective monitoring. Controlling for the firm-level governance structure and firm characteristics which may affect M&A likelihood, we would expect to observe, ceteris paribus, that firms without effective institutional monitoring are more likely to engage in M&A activity than firms with effective institutional monitoring. In this section I examine whether institutional ownership reduces M&A frequency in the full sample, and particularly for the value-reducing ones in the subsamples.
A Full Sample Results
I report the results from the pooled logit model and the fixed effect IV model. The pooled logit model includes year and industry dummies as controls. The IV model allows for firm-level unobserved heterogeneity in mergers and acquisitions decisions, and utilizes both the time-series and the cross-sectional dimensions of the data. Unobserved industry-level heterogeneity is incorporated in this firm-level effects. During the sample period 1992-1999, the telecommunication and broadcasting industry went through major deregulation (1996) . Dummy variables capturing this shock are not significant after controling for firm level fixed effects.
Institutional Ownership Variables I find that the overall institutional ownership (sum of all types) is positively and significantly associated with future M&A activity. I then decompose the overall institutional ownership into three types as detailed earlier, and report results on different types of institutional ownership. Table III reports the first-stage from the IV regressions, which provide information on factors influencing various institutional ownership. The "NA" instruments are constructed by decomposing the respective institutional ownership, and acquisition preference is only one factor among many influencing institutions' investment decisions, as a result, the loading on the same-category instrument is very close to one. The potential bias in the IV estimation, which is scaled by this correlation, is likely to be very small (Staiger and Stock (1997) ).
There is no evidence that public pension funds prefer firms with better governance structure measured by the governance index. There is also no consistent evidence that institutions avoid firms with prior M&A activity. I use two independent dummy variables to measure firms' prior M&A activities. 15 The first dummy equals one if a firm announced a deal in the prior year which received positive announcement abnormal return, and it equals zero for all others. The second dummy equals one if a firm announced a deal in the prior year which received negative announcement abnormal return, and zero for the rest.
The results from the second stage IV regressions are reported in Table IV . PPF ownership has a negative and significant impact on M&A. This impact remains significant and is economically larger when I exclude all other controls. Although the control variables can potentially be endogenous, they do not bias the estimations on the variables of interest. Other institutional investors mostly have either a positive effect or no effect on M&A likelihood.
Controls Table IV also includes other variables. From the perspective of my study, they are primarily controls, and not a focus or subject of interest. Thus I discuss the findings only briefly.
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) constructed an index on shareholder rights by examining firm-level governance rules, most of which are anti-takeover provisions. This index is especially relevant in the context of this study. Mitchell and Lehn (1990) find that firms that make valuereducing acquisitions become takeover targets. Thus a higher level of anti-takeover protection may insulate the management from possible takeovers following a bad acquisition, and consequently encourages bad acquisitions. On the other hand, the management may want more protection because the firms are likely target, hence are less likely to do acquistion themselves. Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) find that firms with stronger shareholder rights (lower index value) made fewer corporate acquisitions. However, their study didn't control for the endogeneity issue. After controling for firm level fixed effects, I show that firms with weaker shareholder rights (higher index 15 The strict exogeneity assumption of panel data models excludes lagged dependent variables(Wooldridge (2001)). This two-dummy approach is to avoid this issue. Results are similar without the inclusion of these two dummies.
value) actually made fewer acquisitions.
When CEOs receive more option grants in their compensation packages, firms are more likely to undertake M&A. If M&A activity adds risk, this result suggests that options encourage risk-taking behavior. However, M&A could also be motivated to reduce risk (diversification for example).
Thus the role of options in the context of M&A activity is unclear. In Jensen and Meckling (1976), larger managerial equity ownership aligns managerial incentives with those of outside shareholders.
There is some evidence in the data that insider ownership is significantly and negatively correlated with M&A likelihood.
Several firm characteristics variables also matter for M&A activity.
1. Firm prior M&A activity and firm size are significantly and positively related to M&A activity in the cross section. However, for one particular firm, prior activity reduces future activity.
2. Tobin's q ratio is positively and significantly related to future M&A likelihood.
3. There is a substitution effect between capital expenditures and M&A activity.
4. M&A activity is motivated by a firm's prior performance. 16 It is possible that firms either extrapolate their prior performance when making investment decisions or take advantage of their relatively high valuations.
B Subsample Results
Some mergers and acquisitions can create value for the acquirers. It is important to know if PPFs have the ability to differentiate between good and bad M&A ex ante, and thus discourage bad deals;
16 I use four measures for prior performance: one-year sales growth rate, cumulative abnormal returns using the benchmark method, cumulative abnormal returns using the Fama-French 3-factor model, and buy-and-hold abnormal returns. I report my results using benchmarked CAR throughout this paper. Results using other measures are similar both in economic and statistical significance, and are available upon request.
or, if the presence of PPF investors deters managers from undertaking M&A, whether it deters the bad M&A only.
Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1991) and Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) suggest worse performance for cash rich, low q acquirers and "buying-growth" acquirers. Table V confirms it. Low q firms and cash rich firms are classified independently. Each year, firms with q ratios less than the sample median are classified as low q firms. Annual median q ratios vary from 1.31 to 1.60. Half of the original observations are classified as low q observations. Cash richness is defined as the ratio of non-current-debt cash and cash equivalents to non-cash total assets (see table I ).
Each year, firms with above industry (by 4-digit SIC code) median cash holdings are classified as cash-rich firms. To define which deal is "buying growth", I need accounting data for the targets.
Target growth rate is defined to be the 3-year sales growth rate prior to the takeover. Deals with target sales growth above the sample median are considered to be "buying growth." Table V reports that among the low q firms, the market responds more favorably towards M&A news when the acquirer is cash poor: cash rich ones have insignificant announcement abnormal returns, while cash poor ones have significant and positive announcement abnormal returns at 68 basis points on average (equal weight). The value-weighted announcement abnormal return is negative for cash-rich and low q firms, and positive for cash poor and low q firms. "Buying-growth" M&A receives significantly negative announcement abnormal returns, while "non-buying-growth" M&A announcement abnormal returns are insignificant. When I look at long-term performance over a 12-month period including the announcement month, cash poor low q firms and "non-buyinggrowth" firms appear to perform better.
If PPF monitoring is effective, I would expect PPF ownership to: 1) have a more pronounced effect in the cash rich group than the cash poor group among the low q firms; 2) reduce the likelihood of "buying-growth" M&A. I find strong support for effective PPF monitoring.
Cash Rich Low-q vs Cash Poor Low-q Table VI shows that the PPF impact among low q firms is concentrated in the cash rich firms, which suggests PPFs' ability to reduce ex ante bad M&A. A 1% increase in the largest PPF ownership leads to a 1.8%-9.7% reduction in M&A likelihood, larger than its impact in the whole sample. PPF ownership has no impact in the cash poor low q subsample. On the contrary, there is some evidence that mutual fund ownership is positively associated with more M&A activity in the cash rich low q group.
Buying-growth M&A Table VII looks at PPFs' impact on the likelihood of "buying-growth" M&A. PPFs reduce the likelihood of "buying growth" M&A: a 1% increase in the largest PPF ownership reduces the probability of buying a fast-growing target by 8%. Again, on the contrary, investment company (mostly mutual funds) ownership is positively correlated with "buying-growth" M&A.
V Institutional Ownership and Performance of M&A
This section looks at bidder long-term stock abnormal returns (including the announcement month), and bidder post-M&A operating performance to judge whether an M&A deal is good or bad.
Appendix A provides the details on the methodologies measuring the performance.
The primary goal of examing long-term stock abnormal returns is not to test for market effi- Mitchell, Pulvino, and Stafford (2004) find that nearly half of the negative acquirer announcement stock return reflects price pressure caused by merger arbitrage.
It appears that M&A firms with higher PPF ownership perform relatively better in the longrun. A one percent increase in the largest PPF investor is correlated with an increase in abnormal return by 0.40%-2.95% per year. In contrast, investment company ownership correlates negatively with long-run abnormal returns.
I also checked whether PPF ownership is correlated with M&A stock performance within the cash rich low q group, but was unable to find a significant association. It is possibly due to limited sample size (less than 400 firm-years and 261 firms). However when I look at their asset turnover rates, they performed worse on average than the industry median both before and after M&A. Also, their asset turnover rates appear to deteriorate after the acquisitions' completion. The decline is not statistically significant except for the subgroup of M&As with publicly traded targets. Table IX reports that PPF ownership is positively associated with improvements in asset turnover rates. An increase of 1% in the largest PPF investor is significantly correlated with is significantly negative.
an improvement of over 3 cents per dollar in the abnormal asset turnover rate. Earlier results show a positive relation between PPF ownership and twelve-month stock abnormal returns, thus this positive association between PPF ownership and abnormal asset turnover rate is less likely to be driven by a relatively low market valuation of firm assets.
VI Robustness check
In a contemporaneous and independent paper, Gaspar, Massa, and Matos (2004) I also model the interaction between institutional ownership and future M&A using a simultaneous equations system. This model assumes that public pension fund ownership and firm M&A activity can have reciprocal influence on each other. The results confirm that the negative impact of PPF ownership on M&A activity is strong and significant.
VII Conclusions
As Holmstrom and Kaplan (2001) point out, the hostile takeover market, which served as a disciplinary force in the 1980s, has largely disappeared in the 1990s. Furthermore, various antitakeover measures adopted by management in the 90s have rendered takeover market ineffective (Bebchuk, Coates IV, and Subramanian (2002)). Black (1992) and Pound (1992) thus argue that the marketand-transaction-based system of corporate governance has evolved into a political model of monitoring. However, empirical research by Bebchuk and Cohen (2005) , Yermack (1996) , and Shivdasani and Yermack (1999), among many others, have cast doubts on the effectiveness of monitoring by the board of directors. There are also many studies examining institutional investor activism, yet few existing ones have documented strong evidence.
My paper documents a strong effect on corporate M&A activity by one class of institutions, major public pension funds. After controlling for ownership endogeneity, firm-level governance structure, and firm characteristics, my study has shown that PPF ownership reduces the likelihood of buying other firms. The reduction in M&A activity is greater in cases with higher potential agency conflict, i.e., for firms with low q ratios but high free cash flows, and for firms seeking to buy fast-growing targets. PPF ownership is also positively correlated with long-run M&A abnormal returns. Overall, I believe that there is enough evidence to support the argument that public pension funds are effective monitors of corporate M&A activity.
Ownership by investment companies is positively correlated with M&A likelihood among firms with higher agency costs. The aggregate investment company ownership is negatively associated with both announcement abnormal returns and long-run M&A abnormal returns. Given these findings, investment companies appear to be the least likely monitors among all types of institutions.
The fact that investment company ownership is negatively correlated with M&A stock performance in the long-run is not explained by the "preference" story, and may instead be more consistent with the story that their presence encourages value-reducing activity by firm management. However, Shleifer and Vishny (2003) demonstrate in their model that a rational manager may undertake an acquisition when the stock is overvalued by an irrational market. In this scenario, M&A is not value-reducing for bidder shareholders at all, despite the post-event drop in stock price as the true valuation is revealed.
The variables on managerial incentives are primarily control variables in this study. It would be interesting to further pursue the effect of managerial incentives on managers' M&A decisions.
It is very possible that factors such as agency costs, which affect firms' M&A activity, also affect firm-level managerial incentives. This endogeneity problem should be addressed in further studies.
Appendix A: Measuring Performance
M&A bidder stock performance is measured by both the announcement abnormal return and the longrun abnormal return. For announcement abnormal returns, I follow standard event study methodology to calculate CARs for the three-day window (-1,1) around the announcement date supplied by SDC. The abnormal returns are estimated using a modified market model:
where r i is the return on firm i and r m is the value-weighted market index return. If there are multiple announcements during the 12-month period, I take the average abnormal announcement return of all announcements during the period.
Measuring long-term abnormal performance is difficult. Barber and Lyon (1997) advocate the use of buy-and-hold abnormal returns over cumulative abnormal returns. They document that cumulative abnormal returns are most affected by new listing bias, and are generally positively biased, while buy-and-hold abnormal returns are generally negatively biased. Kothari and Warner (1997) caution that long-horizon abnormal returns are severely misspecified. Fama (1998) argues that formal inferences about long-term abnormal returns should be based on averages or sums of short-term abnormal returns. Mitchell and Stafford (2000) show that the conventional methodology of calculating multi-year buy-and-hold abnormal returns and conducting inferences via a bootstrapping procedure is flawed because the abnormal returns for event firms are not independent. After accounting for the positive cross-correlations of event firm abnormal returns, they find no abnormal performance in their sample of mergers, seasoned equity offerings, and share repurchases. Brav (2000) uses a Bayesian approach in estimating long-term abnormal returns and finds the three-factor model to be inconsistent with the long-term performance of IPOs.
Since no one measure appears to be perfect, I examine all three measures of long-term abnormal returns: cumulative abnormal returns using the benchmark method, buy-and-hold abnormal returns, and cumulative abnormal returns using Fama-French 3-factor model.
Each month, NYSE/AMEX ordinary common stocks with prior book-to-market values are sorted into 10 size portfolios according to their market capitalizations at the beginning of the month. Within each size portfolio, these stocks are further sorted into 5 groups according to their book-to-market values. The breaking points for these 50 portfolios are used to place all ordinary common stocks with CRSP and COMPUSTAT coverage and prior book-to-market values (to mitigate the new listing bias) into 50 benchmark portfolios.
Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR, benchmarked) are calculated over 12 months for individual event firms, including the announcement month. When there are multiple announcements during a year, CAR is calculated starting from the announcement month of the first announcement.
CAR i = 12 t=1 (R it − R bt ), where R it is the simple monthly return on the common stock of firm i. R bt is the equal-weighted average monthly return of its benchmark portfolio.
Buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) are calculated over 12 months, including the announcement month,
(1 + R bt ). Fama-French 3-factor monthly abnormal return is the α i from the time-series regression of the model:
where R f t is the return on three-month Treasury bills, R mt is the return on the value-weighted market index, SM B t is the difference between the return on a portfolio of small stocks and the return on a portfolio of large stocks, and HM L t is the difference between the return on a portfolio of high book-to-market stocks and the return on a portfolio of low book-to-market stocks. Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR, 3-factor) are then calculated as 12 * α i for individual event firms.
Abnormal post M&A operating performance is measured by changes in industry-adjusted operating cash flow returns, cash flow margins, and asset turnover rates that occur after the deal completion dates. We follow methodologies used both in Barber and Lyon (1996) and in Healy, Palepu, and Ruback (1992) . Barber and Lyon (1996) evaluate different methodologies used to measure accounting-based operating performance, and find the change models to be more desirable than the level models. Firm-level operating performance is adjusted by the industry median before M&A and after M&A. The changes in industryadjusted performance are the measure of M&A abnormal operating performance.
• Operating cash flow return, These operating performance measures are not affected by depreciation and goodwill. Thus, they allow cross-section comparison of firms which used purchase accounting method and firms which used poolingof-interests accounting method. These measures are also not affected by the methods of financing used in mergers because the interest expense is not deducted.
These measures are then adjusted by subtracting industry medians. Industry-adjusted operating cash flow return(IACF), industry-adjusted cash flow margin on sales(IACFM), and industry-adjusted asset turnover rate(IAAT) are calculated for the 3 years before the M&A completion year and the 3 years after the M&A completion year.
The majority of my M&A sample acquired private targets. For the small number of M&As with publicly traded targets, pre-M&A operating performance is calculated as the weighted average between the bidder and the target. The weights are the bidder and the target's market capitalizations at the beginning of the year prior to the M&A completion year.
The median value of operating performance from the 3 years pre-M&A(IACF pre,i , IACF M pre,i , IAAT pre,i ) and the median value of operating performance from the 3 years post-M&A(IACF post,i , IACF M post,i , IAAT post,i ) are used to calculate abnormal operating performance.
I use two methods of calculation. The first one follows Barber and Lyon (1996) . It is the difference between post-M&A industry-adjusted performance and pre-M&A industry-adjusted performance:
The second method follows Healy, Palepu, and Ruback (1992) . Taking into consideration that pre-M&A operating performance may predict the post-M&A operating performance,
These regressions are run on the whole sample of M&A observations to get estimates of the coefficients. The abnormal operating performance of the individual acquirer is thus calculated as, The sample (6,681 observations) are all Execucomp firms (1992 -1999) issuing ordinary common shares, with Governance index available, and excluding utilities, finance and insurance companies and government agencies. The institutional ownership data is from the end of June the following year. Therefore, there is a lag of minimum six months between the firm characteristics data (including the insider ownership and executive compensation data) and the institutional ownership data to ensure that characteristics-related information is all public. The institutional "acquisition preference", F undScorejt, was derived from the composition of the largest investor's portfolio within each category. This "preference" was then used to construct the first instrumental variable for institutional ownership, which is the error term (eit) in a fixed effect regression of institutional ownership regressed on this "preference", InstOwnershipit = α + βF undScorejt + ui + eit. By construction, this error term, called "NA" ownership, is orthogonal to the acquisition-related institutional ownership. The second instrument variable borrows the concept from so-called "Bartik" instrument. It is the interaction between an institutional investor's propensity to invest in each firm and its portfolio size. Each institutional investor j's propensity to invest in a firm i is measured as ui, the firm-level fixed effect, from the following estimation by each institutional investor: This table reports the coefficients from the first stage regressions. The instrumental variable for each category of institutional ownership, "NA" ownership, is the non-acquisition related component of the ownership. It is the eit from the fixed effect regression: InstOwnershipit = α + βF undScorejt + ui + eit. The dummy variable "prior M&A good" equals one if the firm had prior M&A activity which received positive announcement CAR, and equals zero if otherwise.
The dummy variable "prior M&A bad" equals one if the firm had prior M&A activity which received negative announcement CAR, and equals zero if otherwise. Firm's prior M&A activity is split into two dummies to satisfy the strict exogeneity assumption of panel data analysis. For equation 1, 3, 5, 7, 9 and 11, the dependent variables are the aggregate PPF, investment company, and other institutional ownership, respectively. For equation 2, 4, 6, 8, 10 and 12, the dependent variables are the largest PPF, the largest investment company, and the largest other institutional ownership, respectively. The constants are not reported. 
(8)
(10) We report the marginal effects for the pooled logit regressions, and coefficients for the fixed effect IV regressions (a linear probability model). There are a total of 6,693 firm-years in the sample, out of which 30% are M&A observations. This table reports regressions in which institutional ownership is measured as the aggregate holding level (equation 1, 2, 5, and 6) or the largest individual holding level (equation 3, 4, 7, and 8) . The dummy variable "prior M&A good" equals one if the firm had prior M&A activity which received positive announcement CAR, and equals zero if otherwise. The dummy variable "prior M&A bad" equals one if the firm had prior M&A activity which received negative announcement CAR, and equals zero if otherwise. Firm's prior M&A activity is split into two dummies to satisfy the strict exogeneity assumption of panel data analysis. The log of total assets is used as the measure for firm size because the Q ratio is strongly correlated with a firm's market capitalization. Results are similar if firm size is measured as the log of market capitalization.
Dependent variable -1=M&A(30%); 0=no M&A pooled logit
(8) This table reports the means and medians of short-term and long-term M&A performance measures among subgroups of observations. Each year, firms with q ratios less than the sample median are defined to be low q firms. Cash richness is defined as the ratio of non-current-debt cash and cash equivalents to non-cash total assets. Each year, firms with above industry (by 4-digit SIC code) median cash richness are defined to be cash rich firms, otherwise they are cash poor firms. In the subsample of M&A observation for which target pre-M&A three-year sales growth rates are available, deals with target sales growth rates above the median are defined to be "buying-growth," otherwise "non- This table reports the marginal effects for the pooled logit regressions, and the coefficients for the IV regressions with firm-level effects. The subsample is restricted to low q firms with different cash holding levels. For equations 1, 3, 4, 7, and 8, institutional ownerships are measured by the aggregate holding levels.
For equations 2, 5, 6, 9, and 10, they are measured by the largest individual holding levels. Other controls are the same as those used in Table IV . Each year, firms with q ratio less than the sample median are defined to be low q firms. Cash richness is defined as the ratio of non-current-debt cash and cash equivalents over non-cash total asset. Each year, firms with above industry median cash richness are defined to be cash rich firms, otherwise cash poor firms. There are a total of 1,554 cash-rich firm-years and 643 cash rich firms, and a total of 2,169 cash poor firm-years and 747 cash poor firms. Whether the median is defined as cash rich or cash poor does not matter. Cash rich, low q, Dependent variable -1=M&A (25.2%); 0=no M&A Pooled logit
(8) No * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Number of firms 734 * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% This table reports the coefficients and standard errors from the simultaneous equations estimations. The linear system assumes that both the PPF ownership variable and the M&A activity dummy variable are endogenous. The control variables are the same as in Table III and Table IV . Their coefficients and significance are also similar to those reported in Table III and Table IV .
Dependent Variables system (1) system (2 Panel A reports the median operating cash flow return on market value of assets, median cashflow margin, and median asset turnover rate for the M&A firms in years surrounding the M&A completion year. Panel B reports the summary statistics on abnormal operating performance. The first method looks at the changes of industry-adjusted measures (operating cash flow return, cash flow margin on sales, and asset turnover rate). The second method is regression-based, with standard errors reported in parentheses. The median value of firm-level industry-adjusted operating performance from the three years after M&A are regressed on the median value from the three years prior to M&A. The difference between post-M&A performance and the predicted performance measures the abnormal performance. 
Panel

